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The Sources of Regional Variation in the
Severity of the Great Depression: Evidence
from U.S. Manufacturing, 1919-1937
JOSHUA L. ROSENBLOOM AND WILLIAM A. SUNDSTROM
The impact of the Great Depression was milder in the South Atlantic states, more severe
in the Mountain states, and surprisingly uniform across other regions of the country
—despite large diiferences in industrial structure. Employing data on 20 manufacturing
industries disaggregated by state, we analyze the relative contributions of industry mix
and location to regional variations in economic performance. Industrial composition had
a significant impact on employment growth, with regions that concentrated on durable
goods or inputs to construction faring worse than others. Long-run trends also mattered,
and explain much of the South Atlantic's more favorable performance.
The Great Depression was a global crisis, but its severity varied bothspatially and sectorally. Within the United States, the severity of the
1929 to 1933 contraction differed substantially across regions and cities.
Although all regions suffered considerable employment losses, the contraction
was relatively milder and shorter in the South Atlantic states and more severe
and prolonged in the Rocky Mountain states. The severity of the contraction
also varied dramatically across sectors of the economy, with employment
falling most in such industries as construction and durables manufacturing,
more modestly in the service sector and nondurables manufacturing.
The economic fates of regions and industries were clearly linked. Re-
gional economies that were more dependent on cyclically volatile industries
were bound to suffer a relatively more severe contraction of economic activ-
ity during the Depression. But there may also have been a local component
to economic shocks or their propagation that affected all or most industries
within a region. A wave of bank failures in a specific region, for example,
was a disruption to the region's capital markets that could affect any industry
that depended on local sources of capital.
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In this article we explore the sources of regional variation in the severity
and duration of the Depression in the U.S. manufacturing sector, using a
panel data set of employment in 20 manufacturing industries drawn from the
biennial Censuses of Manufactures, 1919 to 1937. Because the data are dis-
aggregated by industry and state, we are able to distinguish the effects of
industry composition and region-specific effects. Furthermore, by using data
that span nearly two decades, we are able to distinguish the short-run impact
of the 1929 to 1933 contraction from longer trends in the growth of regional
economies and industrial sectors. Controlling for the effects of both region
and industry represents the major advance of our article over previous dis-
aggregated analyses of the Depression, which have tended to examine either
regional variation (for example, studies by John Wallis and George Borts)
or industry variation (studies by Michael Bernstein and Rick Szostak), but
not both simultaneously.1
Our analysis confirms the importance of industry mix in the impact of the
downturn on regional economies. Regional manufacturing sectors that were
particularly dependent on demand for inputs by the construction industry
were especially adversely affected by the contraction. The importance of
lumber production in the Mountain and East South Central regions, for
example, accounts for their relatively worse performance during the down-
turn. In the South Atlantic region, where the contraction was relatively less
severe, industry composition played a less important role. Instead, the South
Atlantic benefitted from greater regional trend growth in its manufacturing
sector. Our results suggest generally that region-specific effects of the cycle
were rather small.
The results have implications for some theories of the causes of the De-
pression, even though we do not directly test these theories. To the extent
that region-specific shocks played a limited role in creating regional differ-
ences, the results cast some doubt on theories that would imply strong idio-
syncratic regional effects. For example, disruptions to local capital markets
caused by regionally concentrated waves of bank failures do not appear to
have had large effects on regional manufacturing sectors; nor do New Deal
wage restrictions that may have been more binding in low-wage regions.
REGIONAL VARIATION IN THE SEVERITY OF THE DEPRESSION
Regional differences in the depth and duration of the Great Depression
have been documented for a variety of economic indicators.2 Unemployment
1 Wallis, "Employment"; Borts, "Regional Cycles"; Bernstein, Great Depression; and Szostak,
Technological Innovation. The importance of disaggregation in recent work on the Great Depression
is stressed by Margo, "Employment"; and Calomiris, "Financial Factors."
2 Research using modern data has also found that states vary considerably in the degree to which
their economic fluctuations are linked to national cycles (Sherwood-Call, "Exploring the Relation-
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rates varied considerably across cities and states, for example, and bank
failures were more prevalent in farm states.3 In an important article, Wallis
has shown that employment in both manufacturing and nonmanufacturing
declined less (in percentage terms) and recovered more rapidly in the
South—particularly the South Atlantic—than elsewhere.4 While other re-
gional differences are also revealed by the data, the North-South contrast is
the most dramatic.
Regional variation in the 1929 to 1933 decline and subsequent recovery
are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2, which show, respectively, employment and
the total value of output in manufacturing by census division for the period
from 1919 throughl939, normalized to 100 in 1929.5 In most regions the
trough in employment was reached in 1933, with 1933 employment typically
30 to 40 percent below its 1929 level, and recovery remained incomplete as
late as 1939. The most notable exception is the South Atlantic division,
where employment declined less than 20 percent below its 1929 level.6 The
South Atlantic was the only division in which 1939 employment had recov-
ered to a level above where it stood in 1929. The only other region showing
significantly anomalous behavior is the Mountain region, where as late as
1939 manufacturing employment remained at less than 80 percent of its
1929 level. The regional movements of total product value (Figure 2) are
largely consistent with those for employment.7
Evidence on nonmanufacturing industries is less extensive, but the basic
regional patterns seem to hold outside manufacturing as well. Table 1, for
example, presents an index of employment in retail trade, again relative to
the 1929 value, based on published figures from the Census of Business
(available for 1929, 1933, 1935, and 1939). Retail employment was less
volatile than manufacturing employment, but the superior performance of
ships"). Blanchard and Katz ("Regional Evolutions") show that there are persistent differences in rates
of employment growth across states, with shocks tending to have a permanent effect on the level of
employment. Clark ("Business Cycle Fluctuations") decomposes innovations in employment growth
into national, region-specific, and industry-specific shocks. Controlling for broadly defined industry
groups, he finds that on average about 40 percent of the variance of cyclical innovations in regional
employment growth are region-specific (not attributable to national or industry-specific innovations).
3 On unemployment see U.S. Dept of Commerce, Fifteenth Census and Sixteenth Census; and Simon and
Nardinelli, "Does Industry Diversity." On bank failures see Chandler, America's Greatest Depression;
Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History, Temin, Did Monetary Forces; and Wicker, Banking Panics.
* Wallis, "Employment." See also, Borts, "Regional Cycles."
5 The data in Figures 1 and 2 are derived from the Biennial Census of Manufactures (U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce (various years)). Because of a shift in industrial coverage in 1935, the 1935 figures
are the mean of two values; one consistent with the earlier years and one consistent with the later years.
The difference between these levels was not large.
6 In this article we use the terms "region" and "division" interchangeably, always referring to the U.S.
Census's definitions of divisions.
7 Unemployment rates cannot be directly estimated at the state or regional level except in the decen-
nial census years, 1930 and 1940. For these years unemployment rates by geographical division parallel
the differences in manufacturing employment.
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FIGURE 1
INDEX OF MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT (1929 = 100)
Note: Industrial coverage changed in 1935. Figures for 1935 are the average of two values: one con-
sistent with the industries covered in earlier years, the other consistent with later years.
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Manufactures (various years).
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FIGURE 2
INDEX OF PRODUCT VALUES (1929 = 100)
Note: See Figure 1.
Source: See Figure 1.
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TABLE 1
INDEX OF RETAIL EMPLOYMENT BY REGION
(1929=100)
Region
New England
Middle Atlantic
East North Central
West North Central
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Mountain
Pacific
1933
82.3
79.5
77.7
80.9
89.5
77.3
78.5
73.8
80.8
1935
92.0
91.2
87.0
88.9
104.4
88.6
88.1
88.0
92.3
1939
102.5
100.5
104.1
100.8
130.0
108.5
112.8
113.8
115.7
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of American Business, p. 4,
and Census of Business, pp. 60-62.
the South Atlantic division after 1929 is evident. Regional differences in
manufacturing employment were also mirrored in the behavior of total out-
put and per-capita income.8
The aggregate census employment and production data summarized in
Figures 1 and 2 suggest three stylized facts: the magnitude of the contraction
and recovery was quite similar across much of the country, despite consider-
able differences in industrial structure across regions; the South Atlantic
division experienced a milder downturn and recovered more rapidly than the
rest of the country; and employment losses were severe and relatively persis-
tent in the Mountain states.
What might explain the observed geographical variations in the severity
of the Depression? Most accounts of the causes of the Depression focus on
the role of large national shocks to aggregate demand. Among the potential
sources of such shocks are tight monetary policy; monetary disturbances
caused by the 1929 stock market crash and the bank failures of the early
thirties; increased uncertainty in the wake of the stock market crash; and
unexplained shocks to consumption or investment.9 In addition, supply
effects operating through changing market structure or the pace of techno-
logical change may have contributed to the severity of the Depression.10
Although these shocks would have been national in scope, their propaga-
tion into aggregate disturbances in prices and quantities is likely to have
varied by location because of locational differences in industrial structure,
economic institutions, or other economic conditions. One of the most likely
1 See Schmitz and Fishback, "Distribution."
9 On tight monetary policy, see Friedman and Schwartz, Monetary History; Hamilton, "Monetary
Factors"; and Temin, Lessons. On monetary disturbances, see Friedman and Schwartz, ibid.; and Field,
"Asset Exchanges." On increased uncertainty, see Romer, "Great Crash." On unexplained shocks, see
Temin, Did Monetary Forces.
10 Bernstein, Great Depression; and Szostak, Technological Innovation.
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sources of regional differences is variation in industry composition. Shocks
to aggregate demand have differential effects by industry. As consumer
incomes fall, the demand for relatively more income-elastic goods should
fall relatively further; as real interest rates rise or future incomes become
more uncertain, the demand for durables should decline relatively more than
the demand for nondurables. Industries that produce inputs for industries
with more volatile demand are themselves more likely to experience severe
demand shocks. National economic policies also may affect industries differ-
ently. Barbara Alexander and Matthew Krepps, for example, report that the
effectiveness of industry codes adopted following passage of the National
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933 varied across industries depending
on market structure and product characteristics.11 Finally, technology shocks
are also likely to vary across industries. Borts and Wallis find that industry
composition contributed significantly to locational variation during the Great
Depression, although location-specific effects remain even after controlling
for industry composition.12
The effects of demand shocks on highly cyclical industries could be trans-
mitted to other local industries in a variety of ways. Employment reductions
would reduce worker incomes for purchases of consumer goods produced
locally. Stress on local financial markets may also have spread shocks across
industries. Banking panics, for example, at least before 1933, were essen-
tially local and regional affairs and were concentrated in farming areas,
especially in the East and West North Central and southern divisions of the
country.13 Thus shocks to the money supply could have varied regionally.
Furthermore, as Bernanke has argued, banking crises not only reduced the
money supply but also disrupted the operation of local capital markets.14
Thus access to capital was disrupted for an entire local economy during a
banking crisis.15
Additional potential sources of regional variation include geographical
differences in wealth or wealth distribution and in the impact of government
expenditures or market interventions. To the extent that consumption expen-
11 Alexander, "Failed Cooperation"; and Krepps, "Another Look."
12 Both Borts ("Regional Cycles") and Wallis ("Employment") measure the effect of industry struc-
ture by comparing actual employment behavior across states to a counterfactual in which each industry
is assigned its national rate of employment reduction and then weighted by the state's industry composi-
tion. Unfortunately, this method is biased toward finding a strong industry composition effect. Suppose,
for example that within a region all industries have the same rate of employment loss, but some regions
experience a larger employment decline than others. Industries concentrated in the more volatile region
will appear more volatile, with the result that some of the decline in employment will be mistakenly
assigned to industry mix, when in fact all industries within a region experienced the same reduction in
employment. Only by controlling simultaneously for location and industry can the contribution of
industrial composition be estimated accurately.
13 Chandler, America's Greatest Depression, pp. 83, 84; and Wicker, Banking Panics.
14 Bernanke, "Nonmonetary Effects."
15 For modern evidence of such a regional credit channel, see Samolyk, "Banking Conditions."
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ditures fell due to the wealth effect of declining asset values, the shock to
consumption could have varied with regional variations in wealth or its
distribution. Government expenditures varied across states, partly for politi-
cal reasons.16 The impact of New Deal regulations differed not only by in-
dustry, as noted above, but also by region. Gavin Wright, for example, notes
that the minimum wages established under the NRA and later the Fair Labor
Standards Act were binding for a larger percentage of workers in the low-
wage South.17
A full assessment of all the major potential causes of regional variation in
the impact of the Depression is beyond the scope of the present article. In-
stead, we focus on quantifying the relative importance of industry structure
and region-specific effects. If industry mix accounts for most of the ob-
served regional variation, we may conclude that the Depression was essen-
tially a national phenomenon that was transmitted to the regions via
industry-specific shocks.
THE DATA
Our panel data set is based on the published reports of the biennial Census
of Manufactures for the years 1919 through 1937.18 We collected data for all
48 states (District of Columbia excluded) and for 20 industries. The indus-
tries chosen were the 20 largest (ranked by number of wage earners em-
ployed in 1929) for which we could construct a reasonably consistent series
for the entire period, using the census classification scheme of the period.
Shifts in the definition and constituent industries for certain industry groups
precluded using them in the sample. The 20 industries selected for our sam-
ple were, however, all within the top 31 manufacturing industries nationally
in 1929. Table 2 lists the 31 largest industries according to employment and
gives sample employment and coverage for those included in the study.
For each state-industry observation in each year, we recorded the number
of establishments, the average number of wage earners (employment), and
the total dollar value for the census year of compensation of wage earners,
cost of materials, and value of production. The Census calculated average
annual employment in an establishment as the average of 12 monthly fig-
ures, where each month's employment was the number of wage earners on
the payroll "for the week which included the 15th day of each month, or for
some other representative week."19
'* Wright, "Political Economy."
"Wright, Old South.
" Although we also collected observations for 1939, extensive changes in the industry definitions
between the 1937 and 1939 censuses raised serious questions about the comparability of the data
between those years. We have excluded 1939 from the present analysis.
" U.S. Department of Commerce, Fifteen Census, p. 5.
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TABLE 2
TOP 31 MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES IN 1929, RANKED BY EMPLOYMENT
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
Industry
Foundry and machine-shop products
Cotton goods
Lumber and timber products
Iron and steel: steel works and rolling mills
Car and general construction and repairs, steam RR
Electrical machinery
Motor vehicles
Motor vehicles, bodies and parts
Knit goods
Boots and shoes other than rubber
Bread and other bakery products
Furniture
Clothing, women's
Printing and publishing, book and job
Clothing, men's
Silk and rayon
Printing and publishing, newspapers and periodicals
Meatpacking, wholesale
Cigars and cigarettes
Paper
Canning and preserving
Clay products
Planing-mill products
Worsted goods
Rubber tires and inner tubes
Petroleum refining
Dyeing and finishing textiles
Nonferrous metals
Glass
Confectionery
Chemicals
Number of
Wage
Earners
454,441
424,916
419,084
394,574
368,681
328,722
226,116
221,332
208,488
205,640
200,841
193,399
187,500
150,649
149,868
130,467
129,660
122,505
105,308
103,320
98,866
93,336
90,134
88,485
83,263
80,596
79,327
79,183
67,527
63,501
62,199
Sample
Employment
411,977
418,539
369,197
207,079
218,275
202,608
199,495
193,256
128,315
119,032
98,715
101,343
98,693
89,770
68,398
73,487
73,558
62,548
63,176
58,739
Proportion
Covered
0.970
0.999
0.936
0.916
0.986
0.985
0.993
0.999
0.990
0.972
0.937
0.981
0.998
0.996
0.821
0.912
0.929
0.926
0.995
0.944
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United States,
Manufactures: 1929, table 6.
The employment numbers suffer from various potential biases. The Cen-
sus warned that several of these biases would likely inflate the employment
numbers beyond full-time equivalent employment: part-time employees may
have been counted the same as full-time employees; establishments that were
shut down on the fifteenth of the month might have selected a different week
as more "representative"; and some employees who had been laid off or
terminated might have remained on the payroll for a period, even if they
were not actually at work.
It seems likely that all of these biases dampen the employment fluctua-
tions reported in the Census relative to the actual fluctuations, and thus the
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employment data are likely to understate the size of employment losses
' during the contraction of the early 1930s. Furthermore, the Census did not
systematically report weekly working hours, so the employment numbers do
not completely reflect movements in total labor hours. Cyclical adjustments
in weekly hours were relatively larger during the interwar period than they
have been in postwar cycles.20 Unless there were good reason to believe that
these biases operated differentially by region, however, the data should still
be useful in examining the sources of regional variations in employment
fluctuations. Furthermore, we can compare the results using employment as
the dependent variable with those using total product value, which should
not be subject to the same biases. From Figure 2 it is clear that the overall
regional patterns for product value closely resemble those for employment.
Clearly, our sample is not a random sample of manufacturing industries
or establishments. Some of the most important U.S. industries—such as the
single largest employer, foundries and machine shops, and the clothing
industries—are not represented in our sample; nor are the numerous smaller,
more specialized industries. Still, the sample represents a large percentage
of U.S. manufacturing workers in a wide range of industries, including both
consumer and producer goods and durables and nondurables.
Another shortcoming of the data is its low frequency (biennial). We can-
not capture details of the timing of the Depression that are available to re-
searchers who use monthly series. Still, the biennial observations coincide
roughly with well-known cyclical turning points, such as the trough of the
1920/21 depression, the pre-Depression peak in 1929, and the trough of the
Great Contraction in 1933. It should also be noted that the other major
Depression-decade manufacturing data set that is disaggregated to the state
level—John Wallis's—is benchmarked to the biennial Census of Manufac-
tures, and thus "movements in [his] manufacturing series [correspond] to the
Census of Manufactures between all odd-numbered years."21
To maintain the confidentiality of business establishments, the census did
not report details for establishments in states with very few firms in a given
industry. As a result, our data set has missing values for certain industry-
state cells. Nevertheless, the coverage of our sample is quite good for each
of the 20 industries. Table 2 also reports the proportion of total U.S. industry
employment covered by non-missing observations in our sample. Coverage
exceeds 80 percent in all 20 industries and 90 percent in all but one of them.
The regional coverage of the data is presented in Table 3, which shows the
number of wage earners in our sample as a percentage of all manufacturing
wage earners, by census division, for the beginning, middle (1929), and end
of our panel. For the United States as a whole, our sample covers a little over
20 Bernanke and Powell, "Cyclical Behavior."
21 Wallis, "Employment," p. 50.
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TABLE 3
EMPLOYMENT DM A 20-INDUSTRY SAMPLE AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL
MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT
Region
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Pacific
Mountain
West North Central
East North Central
New England
Middle Atlantic
United States
1919
48.6
44.1
50.2
40.6
28.6
32.8
35.2
33.0
25.3
33.8
1929
51.9
38.4
46.2
53.4
36.9
33.4
40.0
29.6
26.5
36.5
1937
49.6
29.9
46.2
55.1
43.1
38.6
42.7
24.5
26.4
36.8
Source: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Census of Manufactures, 1919,1929, and 1937
one-third of manufacturing wage earners. Coverage varies but is at least 24
percent in every region. Table 3 indicates that between 1919 and 1937 there
were significant changes in our sample's coverage in four of the nine divi-
sions. Coverage fell substantially in the East South Central and New Eng-
land divisions and rose substantially in the Pacific and Mountain divisions.
The declining coverage of our sample in the East South Central is accounted
for almost entirely by the dramatic collapse of employment in the lumber
industry there. As we note below, this imparts a bias toward excessive vola-
tility in our sample for that division. In New England, the drop in coverage is
again attributable largely to one industry—in this case, cotton textiles. In the
Pacific and Mountain regions, the rising coverage of our sample seems to be
due to a relative decline in employment in industries outside our sample.22
For our purposes, the validity of the data depends primarily on whether
they reasonably track the cyclical movement of employment and other vari-
ables, as well as the regional variation in those movements. Figure 3 plots
percentage changes in employment for each census year in our sample,
comparing total U.S. manufacturing with the employment recorded in our
sample.23 The sample tracks changes in total manufacturing employment
quite well. Similar figures for regional subsamples are presented in an ap-
pendix available from the authors. Although there are somewhat larger
deviations between the regional subsamples and the manufacturing totals,
the sample again does a reasonable job tracking the aggregate movements
in most regions. The most important exception is the East South Central, in
which our sample shows a much larger employment reduction between 1929
22 This can be inferred from the fact that employment in most of the individual sample industries is
an increasing percentage of total manufacturing employment in these two divisions.
23 The percentage change for year t is the natural log of employment in year t minus the natural log
of employment in year / - 1 .
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FIGURE 3
EMPLOYMENT CHANGES FOR ALL MANUFACTURING AND 20-INDUSTRY SAMPLE
Notes: The All Manufacturing series uses 1935 employment that is consistent with earlier years in
industrial coverage. Proportional changes are calculated as the change in natural log of employment.
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Census of Manufactures (various years); see the text for
details on the 20-industry sample.
and 1931 than was true for manufacturing as a whole. In the Mountain and
West North Central divisions, the timing of the 1929 to 1933 contraction
differs between the sample and all manufacturing, although the total reduc-
tions over the four-year period are of similar magnitude. To summarize, our
sample seems to provide a reasonable representation of employment move-
ments in the manufacturing sector, with the exception of the East South
Central division.
A PANEL ANALYSIS OF THE INDUSTRY-STATE DATA
Changes in economic activity during the Depression varied by location,
industry, and time period. Furthermore, these variations may have included
both trend changes and cyclical variations around trend. For example, a
relatively large decrease in employment in a particular region during the
1929 to 1933 contraction could have been due to a strong region-specific
cyclical shock, slower trend growth in regional employment, or both. In this
section we present an empirical regression model for our panel data that
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allows us to estimate the separate effects of both trend and cyclical changes
associated with industries and regions. By doing so, we can determine the
extent to which regional variation in the severity of the Depression was the
consequence of variation in region-specific cyclical effects, time trends,
or variation due to differences in the industrial composition of regional
economies.
The dependent variable in our analysis is the percentage change (change
in the natural log) in employment between two biennial manufacturing cen-
suses. The analysis can also be performed for other variables of interest,
such as annual production value or annual wage payments per worker, which
we summarize later in the article. For employment, we define the dependent
variable as
e = \n(E ) ln(£ ,
ist v 1st1 v is,t-
where Eht is employment in industry i (i — 1 , . . . , I), state s (s = 1 , . . . , S),
and time period t (t = 1 , . . . , T), with the unit of time being two years.
The regression model uses dummy variables to capture the effects of
industry (/;,), region (zn), and time (bt), as well as the interactions between
industry and time (fit) and region and time ( gDt). The model, then, is
e
i
ist
= c + h + z + b + f . + g + u ( 1 )
i n t Jit °nt ist v '
where n = 1, . . . , N indexes the region, and wist is an error term. We omit
interactions between industry and region, which would provide estimates of
separate time trends for specific industry-region combinations. As we later
note (see note 26), these interaction terms are not significantly different from
zero in our analysis of variance.
Identification of the model requires imposing identifying restrictions on
the dummy variables. Usually this is accomplished by dropping one category
for each set of dummies, in which case the intercept becomes the value of
the excluded category. Instead, we restrict the mean effect of each set of
dummy variables to be zero. In other words, the model makes the sample
average the reference point for the dummy variables, rather than an arbi-
trarily excluded region, industry, and time period.24 This specification eases
interpretation of the results, but it has no effect on the estimated relative
effects; indeed, the coefficients we estimate can readily be transformed into
those obtained from the conventional restrictions.
24 Marimon and Zilibotti, "'Actual' Versus 'Virtual' Employment," p. 5.
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The following restrictions imply
n
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that the mean coefficient effects are zero
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
V..,r
V,=, r
V
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Because the dependent variable is the percentage change in employment,
the constant term under our specification (equation 1) represents the (un-
weighted) average time trend in employment growth over the whole sample
period, while the effects hx and zn capture the deviations of industry-specific
and region-specific trends from the average or baseline trend. The time-
period dummy variables (bt) represent average year-specific effects and thus
can be thought to capture cyclical movements around the trend that are com-
mon to all industries and regions. Finally, the interaction effects/, and gnt
capture cyclical variations around trend that are specific to individual indus-
tries and regions respectively. If, for example, the coefficient g were more
negative for region A than for region B, it would imply that the cyclical
downturn was more severe in region A, even after controlling for regional
differences in industry composition.
RESULTS: EMPLOYMENT
Results for employment growth rates are summarized in Tables 4 and 5.
Table 4 is a partial ANOVA table for the model. Approximately 40 percent
of the variation in employment growth rates is explained by the model. The
F statistics indicate that all the sets of variables, including the interactions,
are statistically significant in explaining employment growth. Examining the
column for sum of squares, it is evident that the year effects (bt) and year-
by-industry interactions (/-,) account for the lion's share of the explained
variation. In other words, year-to-year variations around trend in employ-
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TABLE 4
ANOVA FOR PANEL MODEL OF EMPLOYMENT GROWTH RATE
Source
Model
Year
Region
Ind
Year* region
Year*ind
Residual
Total
N
/{-squared
Root MSE
Adjusted
/^-squared
Partial SS
299.28
81.49
4.09
14.95
16.66
119.01
464.90
764.18
df
250
8
8
19
64
151
4,466
4,716
MS
1.197
10.187
0.512
0.787
0.260
0.788
0.104
0.162
F
11.50
97.86
4.92
7.56
2.50
7.57
Prob>F
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
4,717
0.3916
0.32264
0.3576
Note: ANOVA estimate using 20-industry sample (see the text).
ment for the economy as a whole and the industry-specific deviations from
those fluctuations are the major source of explained variation in our
sample.25 Region effects, both trend and cycle, are statistically significant,
but account for less of the variation in employment growth.26
Table 5 summarizes the results of estimating equation 1 using unweighted
ordinary least squares. The first column gives the estimated trend coeffi-
cients for average or baseline employment growth (the constant term),
region-specific trends (zD), and industry-specific trends (h{). The remaining
columns give the estimates of the year-specific effects for the baseline (b),
region-time interactions (gnl), and industry-time interactions (/t).
27
The estimated baseline trend (0.004) implies an average biennial growth
rate of just 0.4 percent, a negligible rate of employment growth. Continuing
down the first column, the regional trends show considerable variation. All
three southern regions were regions of above-average growth, controlling for
industry composition, as was the west coast (Pacific). Manufacturing employ-
ment grew more slowly than average in the industrial northeast (New England
and Middle Atlantic), and in the West North Central and Mountain regions.
The year-to-year deviations from trend show the expected patterns. Read-
ing across the first row of Table 5, the severe contraction of the 1919 to 1921
period is evident, as is the recovery that followed. The dramatic employment
reductions of the "great contraction" between 1929 and 1933 also show up
clearly. Looking at the region cycle effects there is some evidence of re-
gional differences in the magnitude of cyclical movements, with the 1929 to
25 This result is consistent with the findings of Ghosh and Wolf, "Geographical and Sectoral Shocks,"
using data from 1963 through 1991.
26 Interaction terms between industry and region are not significantly different from zero when added
to the ANOVA, suggesting that industry trends did not vary systematically across regions.
27 Standard errors and estimated /-statistics are reported in an appendix available from the authors.
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TABLE 5 — continued
(a) Coefficient could not be estimated because of missing data.
Notes: Estimated OLS coefficients from panel regression model (see text).
1931 downturn being much stronger in the East South Central, and much
milder in the West North Central divisions. The industry cycle effects reveal
quite pronounced and relatively systematic differences in the movements of
employment in individual industries. For the most part, the industry effects
in both the 1919 to 1921 and 1929 to 1933 downturns are consistent with the
view that employment fluctuations in durable goods industries were more
volatile than overall manufacturing employment over the cycle, whereas
nondurable goods industries were less volatile.
Our interpretation of the coefficients in the first column of the table as
estimates of trend employment growth is open to the criticism that our sam-
ple period of two decades is simply too short to identify a genuine trend,
particularly considering the fact that the second half of the period is domi-
nated by the Great Depression. Regions exhibiting slow "trend" growth in
employment in our sample may actually be regions that were especially hard
hit by the Depression, with the consequence that the estimated trend over
two decades is negative. If this were true, it would make little sense to claim
a sharp distinction between trend and cycle in our results.
In fact, our estimates of the regional trends are largely robust to changing
the sample period, including estimating the trend on the pre-Depression data
alone. Table 6 presents regional trend coefficients estimated using alterna-
tive sample periods. The first alternative drops the 1919 to 1921 observa-
tions, thus beginning the sample in the 1921 trough. This has virtually no
effect on the variation in regional trends. The second alternative estimates
the trend using only the 1921 to 1929 observations, thus dropping the De-
pression years altogether. Although the East South Central does a little better
and the West South Central a little worse in this sample, the basic regional
pattern of trends remains remarkably similar to that based on the full-sample
estimates. The last column of Table 6 offers another indicator of regional
trends in employment: the percentage change in total manufacturing employ-
ment between 1919 and 1947. The basic regional pattern is overall quite
similar to that indicated in our trend estimates. We thus are confident that
what we have termed regional trend growth rates are capturing more than
regional differences in the severity of the Depression itself.
Accounting for Regional Differences in Employment Growth During the
Depression
The most substantial regional differences revealed in Figure 1 are the
milder contraction of employment in the South Atlantic region and the more
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TABLE 6
ESTIMATED REGIONAL TREND COEFFICIENTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE SAMPLE
PERIODS AND GROWTH OF TOTAL MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT, 1919-1947
Region
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Pacific
Mountain
West North Central
East North Central
New England
Middle Atlantic
United States
Full Sample
1919-1937
0.0355
0.0301
0.0228
0.0363
-0.0207
-0.0368
0.0003
-0.0468
-0.0205
Alternative Sample Periods
1921-1937
0.0381
0.0249
0.0128
0.0403
-0.0161
-0.0371
0.0046
-0.0441
-0.0234
1921-1929
0.0361
0.0452
0.0086
0.0478
-0.0377
-0.0362
0.0082
-0.0423
-0.0296
Employment Growth
(percentage)
1919-1947
49.8
52.8
46.9
53.9
6.2
24.1
39.7
-7.9
12.9
27.0
Notes: Trend coefficients from OLS regressions using 20-industry sample. Employment growth
measured as the change in the natural log of total manufacturing employment. Employment is number
of wage earners in all years except 1947, when it is number of production workers.
Sources for employment growth: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Abstract of the
Census of Manufactures, 1919, p. 280. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Census of
Manufactures: 1947, Volume I, General Summary, p. 32.
severe and prolonged contraction in the Mountain region. Our panel analysis
allows us to examine the role of regional trends and cyclical shocks as well
as industry composition in generating these regional differences.
In Table 7 we summarize the percentage changes in employment for the
1929 to 1933 contraction, the 1933 to 1937 recovery, and the full 1929 to
1937 swing, and decompose these changes into region and industry effects.
The first column shows the actual changes in employment in our sample, by
region and for the United States as a whole. The second column gives the
deviation of the regional change from the U.S. total. The South Atlantic's
milder contraction is indicated by the 14-percentage-point differential between
its employment change and the U.S. average during the period from 1929 to
1933. By contrast, the East South Central and Mountain divisions show the
most substantial negative deviations during the downturn. During the recovery
period (1933 to 1937), the Mountain region bounced back substantially,
whereas the East South Central remained severely depressed. The results for
the East South Central division must be treated with caution, however, to the
extent that our sample overstates the size of the employment contraction there
(see the earlier section on data). New England, which had a relatively mild
contraction, had essentially no employment recovery in our sample.
Taking a longer view, the bottom third of the table shows that between
1929 and 1937 there was considerable regional variation in employment
growth. With the exception of the anomalous East South Central division,
the South fared somewhat better than the national average, as did the Pacific
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TABLE 7
ACCOUNTING FOR REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN EMPLOYMENT GROWTH, 1929-1937
(percentages)
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Pacific
Mountain
West North Central
East North Central
New England
Middle Atlantic
United States total
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Pacific
Mountain
West North Central
East North Central
New England
Middle Atlantic
United States total
South Atlantic
East South Central
West South Central
Pacific
Mountain
West North Central
East North Central
New England
Middle Atlantic
United States total
Actual
Change
-22.7
-68.8
-38.7
-43.0
-65.9
-32.0
-39.5
-25.1
-40.9
-36.9
24.5
39.8
41.9
45.7
54.9
31.1
47.1
-0.8
33.3
34.7
1.8
-29.0
3.1
2.7
-11.0
-1.0
7.6
-25.9
-7.6
-2.3
Region
-USA
14.2
-31.9
-1.8
-6.0
-29.0
4.9
-2.6
11.9
-3.9
-10.2
5.2
7.2
11.0
20.3
-3.6
12.4
-35.5
-1.4
4.0
-26.7
5.4
4.9
-8.7
1.3
9.8
-23.6
-5.3
Region Effects
Trend Cycle
1929-1933
7.1
6.0
4.6
7.3
-4.1
-7.4
0.0
-9.4
-4.1
3.0
-13.8
4.6
-2.9
-4.7
-0.8
3.6
3.8
7.1
1933-1937
7.1
6.0
4.6
7.3
-4.1
-7.4
0.0
-9.4
-4.1
-3.7
7.8
2.5
-4.3
13.2
0.5
-7.5
-6.0
-2.5
1929-1937
14.2
12.0
9.1
14.5
-8.3
-14.7
0.1
-18.7
-8.2
-0.7
-6.0
7.1
-7.2
8.5
-0.2
-3.9
-2.2
4.6
Total
10.1
-7.8
9.2
4.3
-8.8
-8.2
3.6
-5.5
3.1
3.4
13.9
7.1
2.9
9.0
-6.8
-7.5
-15.4
-6.6
13.5
6.0
16.3
7.3
0.2
-15.0
-3.8
-20.9
-3.5
Industry Effects
Trend
-6.0
-6.5
-3.8
-2.8
-4.9
3.9
3.4
1.4
3.7
-3.8
-4.4
-1.6
-0.2
-0.4
5.0
4.1
2.1
6.1
-10.8
-11.5
-6.4
-4.1
-8.2
8.4
7.4
3.4
8.6
Cycle
5.6
-14.2
-2.0
-13.2
-8.4
10.9
-11.0
13.2
0.9
-9.9
7.6
-0.8
10.2
3.1
-12.8
10.9
-14.9
-1.7
-3.9
-5.5
-3.3
-3.0
-2.8
0.7
-1.5
-2.0
-0.2
Total
-0.4
-20.7
-5.7
-16.0
-13.3
14.8
-7.6
14.6
4.6
-13.7
3.2
-2.4
10.0
2.7
-7.9
15.0
-12.8
4.4
-14.8
-17.0
-9.7
-7.1
-10.9
9.1
5.9
1.4
8.4
Region +
Industry
9.7
-28.5
3.5
-11.7
-22.1
6.6
-4.0
9.0
7.7
-10.3
17.1
4.6
13.0
11.8
-14.7
7.6
-28.2
-2.2
-1.3
-10.9
6.5
0.2
-10.7
-5.9
2.1
-19.5
4.9
Notes: Decomposition of effects based on regression estimates from Table 5.
and East North Central. The Mountain and New England divisions lagged
in employment growth over the eight-year period.
To account for the regional deviations, we use the regression coefficients
from the panel model to predict the impact of pure regional effects as well
as industry composition on regional employment, net of the national average
trend and cycle. These effects are summarized in the third through ninth
columns of Table 7. Under the heading "Region Effects," the trend effect is
the regional trend coefficient zn, compounded over the relevant number of
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periods, while the cycle effect is the sum of the region-specific year effects
gnj for the relevant periods.
The effects of industry composition are calculated from counterfactual
regional employment, using the trend or cycle industry coefficients weighted
by the regional employment in each industry in the initial year.28 Because the
estimated industry trend and cycle effects are (by construction) common to
all regions, the industry effects will differ across regions only because of
differences in the relative employment shares of each industry in the differ-
ent regions. The counterfactual employment levels due to industry trends
industry cycles (E*^ are given by
The industry effects presented in the table are the percentage change in em-
ployment between the actual value at time t -1 and the counterfactual value at
time /; for example, the trend effect for region «is ln(.E*treJ) - ln{En,t - /)-
29
The final column of the table adds up the region and industry effects. The
sum of the effects can be viewed as a rough indication of how well these
effects explain the region's deviation from the national average employment
growth, because they are calculated leaving out the common trend and cycle
effects. Thus the final column should be compared with the second column.
Differences between the second and final columns of the table are presum-
ably due to the effects of interactions between industry and region that we
have not captured in the model.
As the estimates for the 1929 to 1933 contraction show, the region effects
are particularly important in explaining the relative mildness of the contrac-
tion in the South Atlantic, and it is the upward trend of employment in the
region that does most of the work. By our accounting, about half of the
South Atlantic's 14-percentage-point advantage in employment loss can be
attributed to its higher trend employment growth. Industry composition had
a negligible impact in the South Atlantic during this period. By contrast,
industry composition played a significant role in the severity of the contrac-
tion in the Mountain division, adding about 13 percentage points to the
region's employment loss relative to the national average. Adverse regional
trend and cycle terms together account for another nine percentage points of
the employment reduction in the Mountain states.
"These industry effects resemble Marimon and Zilibotti's ("'Actual' Versus 'Virtual' Employ-
ment") "virtual region," but here we present separate estimates of the trend and cycle effects of industry
composition.
29 It should be noted that the estimated industry trend effects for each region change somewhat
between the 1929 to 1933 and 1933 to 1937 periods, even though the same trend coefficients are being
used. The reason is the shift in industry employment shares between 1929 and 1933, which alters the
weights used in the calculations.
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Industry composition contributed substantially to the better-than-average
employment changes during the contraction in the West North Central and
New England divisions. In both cases, the industry cycle effect predomi-
nates—that is, employment in both regions tended to be concentrated in
nondurable goods producing industries in which employment movements
were relatively less volatile.30 In these regions the industry effect offsets
substantial negative contributions from the regional trends.
Employment losses in the East South Central region were quite severe
between 1929 and 1933, although, as noted previously, our sample consider-
ably overstates the employment change relative to the figures for manufac-
turing as a whole. In our sample, at least, the weak performance of the East
South Central was a function of a strong negative cyclical shock to the re-
gion as a whole and an especially negative industry composition effect.
The adverse cyclical impact of industry composition in the East South
Central, Pacific, and Mountain divisions can be traced to the heavy concen-
tration of industrial employment in the lumber products industry in these
regions. Table 8 shows the composition of industry employment in our
sample in 1929. Lumber employed over 40 percent of the workers in our
sample in each of these three divisions. Lumber, furthermore, suffered the
largest cyclical shock of any industry in our sample during the 1929 to 1931
downturn (see the coefficients in Table 5). In other words, the dependence
of these regional economies on demand from the construction industry left
them vulnerable to the collapse of construction during the Depression. The
importance of the automobile industry in the East North Central region had
a similar impact on that division, as employment in motor vehicles and parts
production suffered a large negative shock between 1929 and 1933.
Regions that did relatively poorly during the contraction tended to bounce
back during the 1933 to 1937 recovery period. Examining the middle panel
of Table 7, New England stands out as the weakest performer during the
recovery. That region's dependence on cotton goods and boots and shoes,
which dampened employment losses during the contraction, resulted in a
large negative contribution of industry structure during the recovery (less
volatile industries had less recovering to do). Adverse region-specific trend
and cycle terms added to New England's weaker recovery in our sample.
Examining the entire 1929 to 1937 period in the bottom panel of Table 7,
we find that both region-specific and industry composition effects help
explain the regional variation in employment growth over the course of the
Depression. In each of the southern divisions, for example, the effects of
industry composition were quite negative. The two most important southern
30 Among our sample industries cotton goods and boots and shoes accounted for close to 60 percent
of employment in New England, and boots and shoes, bread, and meat packing accounted for close to
55 percent of employment in the West North Central (see Table 8).
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TABLE 8
INDUSTRIAL COMPOSITION OF SAMPLE EMPLOYMENT BY REGION, 1929
(percentages)
Boots
Bread
Canning
Chemicals
Cigars, Cigarettes
Confectionery
Cotton Goods
Furniture
Glass
Iron
Lumber
Mca* Packing
MV parts
Motor Vehicles
Nonferrous Metals
Paper
Petroleum Refining
Planing-Mill Prods
Printing, Newspaper
Rubber tires, tubes
SA
0.48
2.69
2.54
1.21
7.07
0.97
48.89
5.90
2.72
2.76
17.84
0.64
0.12
0.00
0.42
1.05
0.34
2.57
1.80
0.00
ESC
3.07
4.56
1.72
0.92
2.41
1.10
7.48
5.13
0.00
3.80
51.04
1.26
2.35
0.00
0.17
1.09
5.09
5.52
3.31
0.00
WSC
0.14
7.64
2.02
0.45
0.00
1.29
4.99
3.01
0.89
0.00
40.64
3.77
1.00
0.00
0.14
0.00
23.95
3.78
6.29
0.00
Pac
0.30
6.21
14.30
0.90
0.01
1.58
0.46
4.63
0.61
3.01
45.75
2.30
0.99
2.16
0.50
2.24
3.23
4.85
3.86
2.12
Mt
0.00
10.02
8.80
0.15
0.39
3.32
0.00
0.56
0.00
0.00
52.81
6.27
0.20
0.00
0.32
0.00
5.47
2.41
9.27
0.00
WNC
16.68
12.76
3.27
0.61
0.81
3.31
0.00
4.83
0.00
2.15
5.58
24.06
3.24
3.86
0.75
1.20
1.97
5.40
9.40
0.12
ENC
3.94
4.88
1.94
1.43
1.46
1.82
0.22
8.14
2.11
15.59
3.21
4.48
16.38
16.86
2.11
3.57
0.65
2.20
3.22
5.82
NE
24.51
5.13
0.55
1.12
0.61
2.55
36.08
3.77
0.00
0.00
2.81
0.88
1.34
0.00
7.49
8.06
0.33
1.54
3.22
0.00
MA
6.54
8.90
2.19
3.99
5.86
2.48
6.17
5.39
3.47
24.25
4.30
2.09
4.61
3.21
3.06
3.31
2.45
2.22
4.99
0.49
Note: Each column adds to 100 percent.
industries, lumber and cotton goods, both exhibit lower than average trend
growth over our sample period. Only because of strong regional trends in
employment growth were the South Atlantic and West South Central divisions
able to experience above-average employment growth during this period.
By contrast, the regional trend in New England employment accounts for
most of that division's very weak employment growth over the period. In the
Mountain division, both regional and industry trends contributed to slow
employment growth.
In the economy's industrial core (Middle Atlantic and East North Central
divisions), industry trends made a strong positive contribution to employment
growth rates. In the Middle Atlantic, this positive effect was offset almost
completely by a relatively slow regional trend in employment growth. Com-
paring the second and final columns of the table, however, it is clear that our
model does not, on balance, account for the difference in growth rates between
the Middle Atlantic and East North Central over this period.
Implications for Understanding the Depression
Our analysis of regional variation in employment growth sheds light on
several issues. First, regional variations in the trend of employment growth
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were at least as important as regional variations in the cyclical severity of the
Depression downturn, once we control for industry composition. In particu-
lar, the milder contraction in the South Atlantic was largely a function of the
greater trend growth rate of manufacturing employment there. These re-
gional trends may be seen as part of the process of convergence in the sec-
toral structure of employment across U.S. regions during the twentieth cen-
tury.31 Overall employment growth in manufacturing was most rapid in the
South and the Pacific, slowest in the Northeast (see Table 6).
Second, the pattern of region-specific cyclical effects defies any simple
generalizations about the sources of regional vulnerability to the contraction,
and may call into question some widely cited hypotheses about the Depres-
sion. As we have noted, for example, the major waves of bank failures were
often rural in origin and, at least until the 1933 panic, tended to occur at a
much higher rate in the nation's more rural areas: the East and West North
Central, South Atlantic, and East South Central divisions in particular.32 If
disruption of local financial markets played an important role in propagating
the Depression, this disruption might be expected to have spilled over to the
manufacturing sector in these divisions. Yet by our estimates, these divisions
show no consistent tendency toward a larger negative cyclical shock, con-
trolling for industry composition. Of course, the fact that bank failures in
agricultural areas—which tend to drive regional variations in bank failure
rates before 1933—did not have a significant spillover effect on manufactur-
ing does not preclude an important role for bank failures and financial mar-
ket disruptions within industrial areas.
A better place to look for an explanation of the collapse of manufacturing
employment in certain regions would be the dependence of some regional
economies on demand from the building industries. Those areas of the coun-
try may have suffered not only directly from employment losses in the lum-
ber and wood processing industries, but from spillover effects on demand for
locally produced goods, such as bread or newspapers.33
Third, variation across industries in the severity of the cyclical contraction
played a large role in the 1929 to 1933 downturn, but over the course of the
3' See Barro and Sala-i-Martin ("Convergence," pp. 382-92) for evidence on long-run trends in state
per capita income. This convergence is presumably the result of adjustment from an initial disequilib-
rium position. Wright {Old South) attributes low wages in the South to the combination of weak
international demand for cotton in the post-Civil War era and the lack of significant outmigration to
the North until after World War I. More generally, patterns of regional comparative advantage are
subject to recurrent shocks arising from the evolution of technology and market structures. On the
reasons for New England's declining employment in this period, see Rosenbloom, "Challenges."
32 Chandler, America's Greatest Depression, pp. 83-84.
33 The causes and consequences of the collapse of the construction sector during the Depression are
discussed in Field, "Uncontrolled Land Development." Here we emphasize not the direct effects of
declining construction activity on local economies but the impact on manufacturing through the derived
demand for inputs.
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decade broader industry growth trends made the largest contribution to
regional variation in employment growth. Not surprisingly, the cyclical
shock to employment was greater for industries dependent on the construc-
tion sector, and for producers of durable goods such as automobiles, iron,
and furniture. Our analysis cannot distinguish between different sources of
the volatility of these industries, such as differences in the income elasticity
of demand, the impact of uncertainty, or the effects of market saturation.
The Role of Hours of Work
Although the movement of employment is of intrinsic interest, variations
in employment may not accurately characterize variations in total labor
input during the Depression, because average weekly working hours fell
dramatically in many industries.34 When workers care about both wages
and hours of work, hours reductions can have interesting, if ambiguous,
implications for equilibrium real wages during a contraction.35 In some
industries or regions, relatively small employment adjustments may have
been accompanied by relatively large hours reductions. In such cases work
sharing would have mitigated the employment effects of the demand
shock. Changes in the incidence of shift work might also have influenced
the number of hours per worker. For these reasons it would be desirable to
estimate our model for total working hours, or separately for employment
and average hours per worker.
Unfortunately, the Census of Manufactures did not collect data on work-
ing hours until 1933. The hours data used by Bernanke, which were col-
lected by the National Industrial Conference Board (NICB), are aggregated
to the national level.36 For the 11 industries in our sample that overlap with
the NICB industries, we can compare the percentage reduction in hours with
the percentage reduction in employment using a scatter diagram (Figure 4).
Although employment and hours reductions tended to be correlated across
industries (the correlation is about 0.4), there was considerable variation in
the relative importance of hours reductions. Hours reductions were particu-
larly important in the iron and steel industry. Conversely, employment cuts
account for the lion's share of total work-hour reductions in automobiles and
lumber. Whereas the percentage employment loss in the lumber industry was
about twice that in the iron and steel industry, the magnitudes of the reduc-
tions in total worker-hours were actually much more similar.37
34 Bemanke and Powell, "Cyclical Behavior."
35 Bernanke, "Employment."
36 Ibid.
37 The small number of industries represented in Figure 4 makes the correlation very sensitive to outliers.
For example, if w e exclude the two industries with unusually large employment reductions (automobiles
and lumber), the correlation between hours and employment adjustments rises to about 0.6.
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SCATTER OF HOURS VERSUS EMPLOYMENT REDUCTIONS, NICB INDUSTRIES,
1929-1933
Note: Proportional changes calculated as the change in natural log of employment.
Source: Beney, Wages, various tables.
Some fragmentary evidence on hours of work disaggregated by industry
and region is available in various Bureau of Labor Statistics reports on
wages and hours, as well as the Census reports on "Man-Hour Statistics,"
which begin in 1933. These sources can provide some insights into move-
ments in weekly hours in two industries that were especially significant in
parts of the South: the cotton goods and lumber industries. Data for the
period from 1928 to 1933 are summarized in Table 9.
A deficiency of the hours statistics for cotton is that the 1928 and 1930
numbers (from BLS reports) refer to scheduled full-time hours, whereas the
1933 figures (from the Census) are for actual hours. By 1930 the contraction
had almost certainly resulted in shortened actual hours; furthermore, the
depressed condition of the New England textile industry in the late 1920s
may imply that actual hours there were already considerably below the re-
ported "full-time" hours by 1928. These caveats in mind, the table does
suggest that the percentage reduction in working hours between 1930 and
early 1933 was greater in the South Atlantic branch of the industry. Within
the South Atlantic, a dramatic additional reduction in average actual hours
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TABLE 9
AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS OF WORK IN THE COTTON AND LUMBER
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1928-1933
Cotton
New
England1
South
Atlantic2
Weekly hours
Full-time, 1928 47.8
Full-time, 1930 47.5
Actual, January 1933 39.7
Actual, November 1933 36.2
Actual, Average 1933 39.4
Changes (percentages)
1928-1930 -0.7
1930-January 1933 -17.8
January 1933-^Iovember 1933 -9.4
1930-Average. 1933 -18.6
East South
Lumber Central
55.6
55.3
43.3
34.5
40.0
-0.6
-24.5
-22.8
-32.5
Mountain3 Pacific
South
Atlantic4
West South
Central5
Weekly hours (actual)
1928
1930
1932
Changes (percentages)
1928-1930
1930-1932
1928-1932
52.4
46.6
45.7
-11.7
-1.8
-13.5
44.8
46.3
35.6
3.5
-26.3
-22.9
48.5
46.3
37.4
-4.6
-21.4
-26.0
54.4
50.5
43.2
-7.4
-15.6
-23.0
51.3
49.5
36.9
-3.6
-29.5
-33.1
Notes: Regions correspond to census divisions except as noted.
1. Excludes Vermont in 1928 and 1930, includes it in 1933.
2. Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia in 1928 and 1930; Maryland added in 1933.
3. Idaho, Montana
4. Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia.
5. Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas.
Sources: U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wages and Hours in Cotton-Goods
Manufacturing, 1910-1930, BLS Bulletin No. 539, p. 9. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Census of Manufactures: 1933, Man-Hour Statisticsfor 32 SelectedIndustries,tables2,3. U.S.
Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wages and Hours in the Lumber Industry in the United
States: 1928, BLS Bulletin No. 497, p. 36. U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Wages and
Hours in the Lumber Industry in the United States: 1932, BLS Bulletin No. 586, p. 6.
occurred during 1933, coinciding with the implementation of the NRA code
of 40 hours in textiles. In fact, by November of 1933, average hours in both
regions had fallen to well below 40 hours, raising the question of whether
the NRA hours code was actually binding.
Our decompositions suggest that employment reductions in the lumber
industry were probably a significant factor in the relatively poor perfor-
mance of the East South Central and Mountain divisions during the early
1930s. Table 9 shows that as of 1932, hours reductions were smaller in the
East South Central branch of the lumber industry than elsewhere, although
the region may have experienced more substantial reductions during 1933
740 Rosenbloom and Sundstrom
TABLE 10
ANOVA FOR PANEL MODEL OF PRODUCT VALUE GROWTH RATE
Source
Model
Year
Region
Ind
Year* region
Year* ind
Residual
Total
/{-squared
Root MSE
Adjusted
/{-squared
Partial SS
617.92
231.16
4.56
19.13
21.53
161.39
926.62
1,544.54
df
250
8
8
19
64
151
4,463
4,713
MS
2.472
28.895
0.570
1.007 '
0.336
1.069
0.208
0.328
F
11.90
139.17
2.75
4.85
1.62
5.15
Prob>F
0.000
0.000
0.005
0.000
0.001
0.000
4,714
0.4001
0.45566
0.3665
Notes: ANOVA estimate using 20-industry sample (see the text).
when the NRA code set weekly hours in lumber at 40. On balance, the evi-
dence on hours in the lumber industry suggests that if we could examine the
reduction in total worker-hours, the contraction in the lumbering regions
(especially the East South Central) would not look quite as severe as it does
in terms of employment alone, as compared with other parts of the country.
The fragmentary evidence on hours summarized here indicates that there
may have been significant regional differences in hours adjustments, both
because of differences in industry composition and because of regional
differences within industries. Consequently, our results for employment
variation must be interpreted with care: they are not necessarily indicative
of variations in total labor input, as measured by total worker hours. To the
extent that regional differences in employment variations were offset by
shifts in weekly hours, the question becomes why the margins of adjustment
differed from one part of the country to another.
RESULTS: PRODUCT VALUE
The Census of Manufactures collected data not only on employment but also
on the annual value of production and materials costs. Panel regression results
for growth rates of nominal product value are presented in Tables 10 and 11,
which are analogous to Tables 4 and 5 for employment growth. The analysis of
variance, presented in Table 10, indicates that all the groups of dummy variables
as well as their interactions are significant, with the year and year-by-industry
effects again accounting for the bulk of the explained variation.
Interpretation of the results for nominal product value is hampered by the
fact that movements in product value reflect the joint influence of price and
T
A
B
L
E
 1
1
PR
O
D
U
C
T
 V
A
L
U
E
 R
E
G
R
E
SS
IO
N
 (d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e:
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 of
 p
ro
du
ct
 v
al
ue
)
B
us
in
es
s 
C
yc
le
 D
ev
ia
tio
ns
T
re
nd
 
19
19
-1
92
1 
19
21
-1
92
3 
19
23
-1
92
5 
19
25
-1
92
7 
19
27
-1
92
9 
19
29
-1
93
1 
19
31
-1
93
3 
19
33
-1
93
5 
19
35
-1
93
7
B
as
el
in
e 
ef
fe
ct
s 
-0
.0
02
 
-0
.3
16
 
0.
32
4 
0.
08
2 
-0
.0
74
 
0.
13
0 
-0
.5
39
 
-0
.3
21
 
0.
42
5 
0.
29
1
R
eg
io
n 
ef
fe
ct
s
So
ut
h 
A
tla
nt
ic
 
0.
00
3 
-0
.2
32
 
0.
08
1 
-0
.0
15
 
0.
07
7 
-0
.0
12
 
0.
01
5 
0.
09
3 
-0
.0
06
 
0.
00
0
E
as
t S
ou
th
 C
en
tr
al
 
0.
04
1 
-0
.0
25
 
0.
06
3 
-0
.0
28
 
0.
01
2 
0.
03
1 
-0
.1
50
 
0.
01
6 
0.
05
2 
0.
02
9
W
es
t S
ou
th
 C
en
tr
al
 
0.
03
1 
-0
.1
24
 
-0
.0
82
 
0.
07
6 
0.
08
2 
0.
00
8 
-0
.0
99
 
0.
07
9 
-0
.0
23
 
0.
08
4
P
ac
ifi
c 
0.
04
1 
0.
19
2 
-0
.0
12
 
-0
.1
18
 
0.
02
2 
-0
.0
16
 
0.
01
7 
-0
.0
07
 
-0
.0
38
 
-0
.0
41
M
ou
nt
ai
n 
-0
.0
24
 
0.
05
5 
-0
.1
01
 
-0
.0
56
 
-0
.0
09
 
0.
04
5 
0.
00
1 
-0
.0
49
 
0.
17
1 
-0
.0
57
W
es
t N
or
th
 C
en
tr
al
 
-0
.0
36
 
-0
.0
13
 
0.
02
3 
-0
.0
12
 
0.
02
3 
-0
.0
08
 
0.
22
2 
-0
.1
75
 
-0
.0
49
 
-0
.0
10
E
as
t N
or
th
 C
en
tr
al
 
0.
00
7 
0.
00
9 
0.
05
3 
-0
.0
12
 
0.
03
6 
-0
.0
11
 
-0
.0
22
 
-0
.0
13
 
-0
.0
32
 
-0
.0
10
N
ew
 E
ng
la
nd
 
-0
.0
45
 
0.
06
0 
-0
.0
35
 
-0
.0
21
 
0.
01
0 
0.
00
7 
0.
03
7 
-0
.0
22
 
-0
.0
06
 
-0
.0
29
M
id
dl
e 
A
tla
nt
ic
 
-0
.0
19
 
0.
07
7 
0.
01
1 
0.
18
7 
-0
.2
53
 
-0
.0
44
 
-0
.0
21
 
0.
07
8 
-0
.0
69
 
0.
03
4
In
du
st
ry
 e
ff
ec
ts
B
oo
ts
 
-0
.0
47
 
-0
.4
66
 
0.
17
3 
-0
.1
59
 
0.
21
6 
-0
.0
14
 
0.
09
5 
0.
27
3 
-0
.0
64
 
-0
.0
54
B
re
ad
 
0.
03
9 
0.
17
3 
-0
.3
32
 
0.
05
6 
0.
13
1 
-0
.0
36
 
0.
19
8 
0.
04
5 
-0
.0
81
 
-0
.1
53
C
an
ni
ng
 
0.
07
1 
-0
.3
79
 
-0
.0
10
 
0.
15
3 
0.
01
9 
0.
19
9 
0.
03
2 
0.
16
6 
-0
.0
68
 
-0
.1
11
C
he
m
ic
al
s 
0.
07
2 
0.
11
1 
0.
01
8 
0.
41
4 
-0
.8
40
 
0.
07
4 
0.
19
4 
0.
10
8 
-0
.0
28
 
-0
.0
52
C
ig
ar
s,
 C
ig
ar
et
te
s 
-0
.1
82
 
0.
38
1 
-0
.2
38
 
-0
.0
81
 
0.
11
1 
-0
.0
88
 
0.
27
1 
-0
.1
86
 
-0
.1
07
 
-0
.0
62
C
on
fe
ct
io
ne
ry
 
-0
.0
73
 
0.
07
3 
-0
.1
72
 
0.
01
5 
0.
09
5 
-0
.0
51
 
0.
14
6 
0.
09
6 
-0
.1
36
 
-0
.0
66
C
ot
to
n 
G
oo
ds
 
-0
.0
73
 
-0
.1
40
 
0.
18
2 
-0
.1
46
 
0.
05
4 
-0
.0
15
 
-0
.0
27
 
0.
38
2 
-0
.1
64
 
-0
.1
27
Fu
rn
itu
re
 
0.
03
4 
0.
17
6 
-0
.0
60
 
0.
08
8 
0.
04
0 
0.
00
5 
-0
.0
80
 
-0
.2
72
 
-0
.0
02
 
0.
10
6
G
la
ss
 
0.
04
1 
0.
08
4 
-0
.0
92
 
-0
.1
41
 
0.
07
6 
-0
.0
91
 
0.
21
5 
0.
18
1 
-0
.1
32
 
-0
.1
00
Ir
on
 
0.
06
3 
-0
.4
57
 
0.
40
6 
-0
.1
60
 
0.
10
7 
0.
09
9 
-0
.3
44
 
0.
06
7 
0.
12
6 
0.
15
6
L
um
be
r 
-0
.0
96
 
-0
.0
71
 
0.
10
0 
0.
00
1 
0.
01
6 
-0
.0
15
 
-0
.4
28
 
0.
07
0 
0.
24
1 
0.
08
7
M
ea
tp
ac
ki
ng
 
-0
.0
10
 
-0
.2
85
 
-0
.0
68
 
0.
11
2 
0.
12
2 
0.
00
8 
0.
09
3 
-0
.0
09
 
0.
07
7 
-0
.0
51
M
V
 p
ar
ts
 
0.
03
4 
0.
00
5 
0.
23
7 
-0
.3
65
 
0.
01
5 
-0
.0
34
 
-0
.0
80
 
-0
.1
15
 
0.
27
0 
0.
06
6
M
ot
or
V
eh
ic
le
s 
0.
03
9 
-0
.0
14
 
0.
19
2 
-0
.1
59
 
-0
.1
82
 
0.
30
7 
-0
.2
69
 
-0
.3
09
 
0.
31
8 
0.
11
8
N
on
fe
rr
ou
s 
M
et
al
s 
0.
01
9 
-0
.2
77
 
0.
37
1 
-0
.1
77
 
0.
00
1 
0.
12
7 
-0
.4
06
 
-0
.0
33
 
0.
16
8 
0.
22
7
Pa
pe
r 
0.
05
6 
0.
18
0 
-0
.0
33
 
0.
01
2 
-0
.0
31
 
-0
.0
82
 
0.
10
6 
0.
13
4 
-0
.2
61
 
-0
.0
25
Pe
tr
ol
eu
m
 R
ef
in
in
g 
0.
06
3 
0.
23
7 
-0
.2
49
 
0.
20
2 
-0
.0
51
 
0.
00
3 
-0
.0
55
 
0.
14
1 
-0
.1
68
 
-0
.0
61
Pl
an
in
g-
M
ill
 P
ro
ds
 
-0
.0
47
 
0.
24
2 
0.
03
4 
0.
07
5 
-0
.0
77
 
-0
.0
63
 
-0
.2
55
 
-0
.2
97
 
0.
14
6 
0.
19
5
Pr
in
tin
g,
 N
ew
sp
ap
er
 
0.
04
4 
0.
42
7 
-0
.2
81
 
0.
01
7 
0.
11
5 
-0
.0
57
 
0.
58
4 
-0
.3
68
 
-0
.2
48
 
-0
.1
88
R
ub
be
r  
tir
es
, t
ub
es
 
-0
.0
48
 
(a
) 
-0
.1
78
 
0.
24
2 
0.
06
4 
-0
.2
74
 
0.
01
2 
-0
.0
72
 
0.
11
3 
0.
09
3
3 8 5' o
742 Rosenbloom and Sundstrom
TABLE 11—continued
(a) Coefficient could not be estimated because of missing data.
Notes: Estimated OLS coefficients from panel regression model (see the text).
quantity changes. Sorting these effects out would require price indices
disaggregated to the region and industry level, which to our knowledge
are not available. A comparison of the coefficients in Tables 5 and 11
reveals similarities as well as differences between the behaviors of em-
ployment and product value. The patterns of region and industry time
trends are generally similar, with the notable exception that the time
trend in the South Atlantic is considerably weaker for product value than
it is for employment.38
The business cycle deviations for product value during the Depression
years are also qualitatively similar to those for employment. Among the
industries, lumber and planing-mill products experienced substantial nega-
tive deviations during the 1929 to 1933 period, as did such durables indus-
tries as furniture, iron, and motor vehicles. The regional patterns of cyclical
deviations are also similar to those for employment, with the South Atlantic
again the exception: there, the region-specific cyclical component is much
larger for product value than for employment during the 1931 to 1933 pe-
riod. In sum, the results for product value appear to be largely consistent
with those for employment, with the exception of somewhat anomalous
results for the South Atlantic division.
RESULTS: TWO MEASURES OF LABOR COST
The seemingly perverse upward movement of real wages during the first
half of the Depression has been noted by a number of authors, and wage
stickiness is often named as a likely suspect in creating the high unemploy-
ment rates of the 1930s.39 Wright argues that New Deal wage policies had
a particularly strong effect in the South, where minimum wages were bind-
ing for a large percentage of workers and had adverse employment
effects.40 Movements in labor costs may also have affected trend employ-
ment growth across regions. In our analysis of employment growth (see
Table 5), we find significantly positive trend employment growth in all
three southern divisions, which helped moderate the adverse effects of the
Depression in the South. Was employment growth in the South associated
with regional differences in wage trends that were making the South rela-
tively attractive to employers?
38 T h e weaker trend o f product va lue in the Sou th Atlantic would be consistent wi th greater reduc-
t ions in working hours there, which would lead to lower output levels, given employment.
39 O n this issue see Margo, "Employment"; Dighe, "Wage Rigidity"; and sources cited therein.
40 Wright, Old South, pp. 216-25.
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To investigate regional and industrial movements in labor costs, we derive
two measures from our Census data. The first is simply the nominal average
annual earnings of wage earners, which we calculate by dividing the annual
wages by average annual employment. Because we do not have dis-
aggregated measures of product prices, we cannot deflate the average annual
earnings to a real product wage. Furthermore, the annual earnings figures do
not reflect changes in annual hours worked.
The second measure of labor costs is the ratio of total wage payments
(wage bill) to value added (product value minus materials costs), or the
wage share of value added. This measure corresponds to the "adjusted
real wage" used by Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway, and is also
equivalent to the ratio of the real hourly product wage to average labor
productivity per worker hour.41 As a measure of real labor costs, the
wage share has two advantages: first, it is proportional to the hourly
product wage and is not directly sensitive to hours per worker; and sec-
ond, it is deflated by the product price. It will, however, vary inversely
with changes in labor productivity.
The panel results for the growth rate of each measure of labor costs are
summarized in the ANOVA tables presented in Table 12: the upper panel
uses the growth rate of average annual earnings as the dependent variable,
the lower panel uses the growth rate of the wage share.42 For neither measure
are the regional dummy variables significant. In other words, these results
provide no evidence of regional differences in trend growth of labor costs
during this period.
Nominal annual earnings did exhibit statistically significant regional differ-
ences in the cyclical component, and the regression coefficients (not reported
here) do provide some evidence of faster earnings growth in much of the
South during the NRA period, 1933 through 1935. During the NRA years, the
national average of nominal earnings in our sample rose 16.1 percentage
points faster than trend; in the South Atlantic, earnings growth was about 2.4
percentage points greater than that; and in the East South Central, it was 1.3
percentage points greater. On the other hand, the industry effects for the same
period show falling earnings in some of the dominant low-wage southern
industries, including cigars and cigarettes and cotton goods.43
41 Vedder and Gallaway, Out of Work To see this, note that value added is Pq - Raq, where P is the
output price, q is the quantity produced, R is an index of materials prices, and a is the amount of
materials per unit of output. The wage bill is WEH, where W is the hourly wage, E is employment, and
H is average annual hours per worker. Then the wage share of value added is WEH I {Pq - Raq) =
W I(P - Ra) * 1 / {q I EH) = w I k, where w is the real hourly product wage (deflated by value added
per unit) and X is the average productivity of labor.
42 Full tables of the estimated regression coefficients are available in an appendix from the authors.
43 This latter effect may reflect the southern differentials written into some NRA codes, which
allowed southern manufacturers to play lower wages in some circumstances.
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TABLE 12
ANOVA FOR PANEL MODELS OF GROWTH RATE IN LABOR COSTS
Source
Panel A:
Model
Year
Region
Ind
Year* region
Year'ind
Residual
Total
N
/{-squared
Root MSE
Adjusted
/{-squared
Panel
Model
year
region
ind
year* region
year* ind
Residual
Total
N
/{-squared
Root MSE
Adjusted
/{-squared
Partial SS df MS F Prob>F
Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Nominal Average Annual Earnings
98.37
30.33
0.10
1.53
3.78
32.53
174.43
272.79
250
8
8
19
64
151
4,464
4,714
0.393
3.791
0.013
0.080
0.059
0.215
0.039
0.058
10.07
97.02
0.33
2.06
1.51
5.51
0.000
0.000
0.954
0.005
0.006
0.000
B: Dependent Variable: Growth Rate of Wage Share of Value Added
176.49
27.69
0.35
0.91
12.04
125.96
871.05
1047.54
249
8
8
19
64
150
4,294
4,543
0.709
3.462
0.044
0.048
0.188
0.840
0.203
0.231
3.49
17.07
0.22
0.24
0.93
4.14
0.000
0.000
0.988
1.000
0.641
0.000
4,715
0.361
0.19767
0.325
4,544
0.1685
0.45039
0.120
variables.
For the wage share variable, only the year effects and year-by-industry
interactions are significant (see the lower panel of Table 12). By this measure
of labor costs, there are no significant region effects in either the trend or
cyclical components. These results appear to be at odds with Wright's argu-
ment that New Deal policies raised real wages relatively more in the South
than elsewhere. Only if regional differences in the movement of real product
wages were masked by offsetting regional differences in the path of average
labor productivity would our results be consistent with this hypothesis.
CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that regional variation in the severity of the Great Depres-
sion in manufacturing can be attributed largely to two factors: regional dif-
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ferences in trend employment growth, and regional differences in industrial
composition. Put somewhat differently, the severity of the Depression down-
turn did not actually differ dramatically across regions, once we account for
trends and industry structure. Regional manufacturing sectors that were more
concentrated in the production of goods with highly volatile demand, such
as durables and inputs to construction, were relatively hard hit. Regions that
were experiencing higher trend growth rates of employment experienced a
somewhat milder contraction.
Overall, then, the Depression's impact was truly national in scope, per-
haps because the principal demand shocks were common to all regions (for
example, due to Federal Reserve policy), or because the impact of the shocks
spread through national product markets to affect all regions. We find little
evidence that regional variation in the severity of bank failure waves had
region-specific effects on local economies; nor do we find systematic evi-
dence that New Deal policies raised wage costs or reduced employment
more in the low-wage South than elsewhere. Future attempts to explain the
depth and duration of the Great Depression using disaggregated data would
do well to focus on causes that varied across industries, where we have
found the most substantial differences in the impact of the contraction.
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